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Oil-Price Swaps: Should These Innovative
Financial Instruments be Subject to
Regulation by the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission or the Securities and
Exchange Commission?
I. Introduction
In an economy in which commodity prices are extremely volatile
and virtually unpredictable, corporations and other commercial insti-
tutions that either produce or use large quantities of commodities
constantly are looking for new ways to protect themselves from the
risks of price fluctuations. Commodity futures contracts have been
the traditional mechanism by which such enterprises have hedged1
themselves against price risk. As the economy grows more complex,
however, financial institutions are recognizing the desire of corpora-
tions for instruments tailored to their specific commercial needs. Re-
sponding to these needs, Chase Manhattan Bank of New York has
recently introduced an instrument known as an oil-price swap2 that
resembles a futures contract3 and protects major oil producers and
users from drastic changes in oil prices. Such commodity price index
swaps4 are just one type of the many new hybrid instruments' that
1. Hedgers are individuals or firms that make purchases and sales in the futures market
solely for the purpose of locking in a price for commodities that they later intend to buy or sell
in the cash market. NATIONAL FUTURES ASSOCIATION, UNDERSTANDING OPPORTUNITIES AND
RISKS IN FUTURES TRADING 5 (1986). Hedgers offset losses in the cash market because of
adverse price changes with the gains made in the futures market by taking a position, equal
but opposite, to the position they held in the cash market. Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 287
(2d Cir. 1980). See infra notes 56, 58, 120, 148.
2. At the time of publication, Chase Manhattan Bank is one of several financial institu-
tions that aggressively markets these swaps. Chase completed its first oil-price swap in October
of 1986. Horowitz, Swap Product from Chase Draws Scrutiny, AMERICAN BANKER, Apr. 23,
1987, at 2, col. 1. Bank of America is currently in the process of reviewing a similar product.
Horowitz, Regulator Allows Chase to Offer Commodity Swaps, AMERICAN BANKER, Aug. 18,
1987, at 1, col. 1. Salomon Inc.'s Phibro Engergy Unit is also working on a swap product
similar to Chase's. Monroe, Banks Begin Offering Oil-Price Swaps To Help Hedge Commod-
ity-Market Risks, Wall St. J., Apr. 9, 1987, at 59, col. 1.
3. For a discussion of what constitutes a "futures contract," see infra notes 111-35 and
accompanying text.
4. "Commodity-price index swap" is the generic name used by Chase Manhattan Bank
to encompass a variety of different commodity-based swaps; an oil-price swap is merely one
type of commodity-price index swap that revolves around the price of oil. Chase also markets
swaps tied to copper and aluminum prices. Horowitz, Swap Product from Chase Draws Scru-
tiny, American Banker, Apr. 23, 1987, at 2, col. 1. See generally Chase Manhattan Bank,
N.A., Comptroller of the Currency No-Action Letter [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Bank. L.
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possess the characteristics of forward 6 and futures contracts7 as well
as possessing attributes of a security.
This Comment addresses the characteristics of oil-price swaps.
In light of these characteristics, this Comment considers whether
these swaps are "futures contracts" subject to regulation by the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC"); whether they
are "securities" subject to regulation by the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC"); or whether they are merely customized com-
mercial transactions involving sophisticated participants and posing
no threat of fraud, abuse, excessive speculation or price manipulation
to the general public, and thus should be subject only to limited reg-
ulation by banking authorities.8 The following analysis outlines the
Rep. (CCH) 84,034 (July 20, 1987). Chase officials state that swaps could be based on any
commodity that has "an efficient market, a widely accepted price index and a volatile price."
Monroe, supra note 2. Chase is considering swaps based on the prices of gas and commercial
chemicals. Id.
5. Other types of off-exchange instruments resembling futures contracts include:
Leverage Contracts: Standardized contracts for the long-term purchase or sale of leverage
commodities that are marketed to the general public. 50 Fed. Reg. 11,656 (Mar. 25, 1985).
Leverage contracts, although regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, are
not required to be traded on an exchange. 7 U.S.C. § 23 (1982). See also CFTC-OGC Statu-
tory and Regulatory Interpretation, The Regulation of Leverage Transactions and Other Off-
Exchange Future Delivery Type Instruments, 50 Fed. Reg. 11,656 (Mar. 25, 1985). This In-
terpretation analyzes the differences between leverage contracts and off-exchange futures
transactions. See also Breyer v. FNMC, 548 F. Supp. 955 (D.N.J. 1982); White & Stein,
New Off-Exchange Futures-Related Instruments: Modern Day 'Bucket Shops' or Legitimate
Products, Vol. 7, No. 3, J. FUTURES MARKETS 341 (1987) (also discussing exchange-for-physi-
cals, commodity-index debt, and callable, putable, convertible debt.)
Interest Rate Swaps: Interest-rate swaps involve the exchange of interest payments for a
specified period of time between two parties without an exchange of the underlying principal.
Simonson, A Time for Swaps, U.S. BANKER, Feb. 1987, at 51. In its most basic form, referred
to as the "generic" or "plain vanilla" swap, the interest-rate swap involves one party exchang-
ing its fixed-rate interest payment for the other party's floating or variable rate payments.
Jasper, Ross & Henderson, The Economics of Interest Rate Swaps, INTEREST RATE AND CUR-
RENCY SWAPS 1986 35 (1986). See also Olander & Spell, Interest Rate Swaps: Status Under
Federal Tax and Securities Law, 45 MD. L. REV. 21 (1986); Gilberg, Regulation of New
Financial Instruments Under the Federal Securities and Commodities Laws, 39 VAND. L.
REV. 1599, 1640 (1986) (also discussing options on foreign currencies, forward contracts on
foreign currencies, commodity-backed bonds, derivative instruments on exempt securities, com-
modity financing programs, and deferred pricing agreements.)
Indexed Off-Exchange Obligations: See Hiden and Crawshaw, Indexed Off-Exchange
Obligations, 7 COMMODITIES LAW LETTER 1 Mar. 1987.
6. For a discussion of forward contracts, see infra notes 136-46 and accompanying text.
7. For a discussion of futures contracts, see infra notes 111-35 and accompanying text.
8. On July 20, 1987, the Comptroller of the Currency, the administrator of national
banks, issued a No-Action Letter in response to Chase Manhattan Bank's proposal that the
bank serve as an intermediary in commodity-price index swaps with its customers. The comp-
troller's No-Action Letter recognized the transaction as incidental to both the "express power
of 'loaning of money on personal security'" and to the "business of banking" as authorized
under the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (seventh) (1982). Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.,
Comptroller of The Currency No-Action Letter, [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Bank. L.
Rep. (CCH) 84,034, at 76,638 (July 20, 1987) [hereinafter No-Action Letter]. For an anal-
ysis of what activities qualify as incidental to the "business of banking," see the following:
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reasons that oil-price swaps should not be regulated as either securi-
ties or futures contracts.
II. What is an Oil-Price Swap?
Oil-price swaps are long-term financial instruments that enable
participants to hedge against oil price fluctuations over a period of
two to five years.9 To accomplish a swap, a large, financially secure
bank, serving as an intermediary,"0 markets the product to major oil
users and producers, allowing each participant to lock-in a fixed
price for the oil that they wish to buy or sell. 1
Oil-price swaps allow the participants to hedge against fluctua-
tions in the price of oil. 12 While oil producers fear price declines, oil
users strive to protect themselves from price increases. Oil-price
swaps effectively meet both participants' needs.
FIGURE 1
OIL-PRICE SWAP
Fixed Quantity of Oil Fixed Quantity of Oil
x x
Fixed Price Fixed Price
OIL > INTERMEDIARY > OIL
USER Variable Price BANK Variable Price PRODUCER
X Fixed Quantity of Oil X Fixed Quantity of Oil
The typical oil-price swap involves two separate agreements, 3
as diagramed in Figure 1. In the first agreement, the oil user agrees
Auten v. United States Nat'l Bank, 174 U.S. 125-41 (1899); M & M Leasing Corp. v. Seattle
First Nat'l Bank, 563 F.2d 1377, 1382 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978);
American Ins. Ass'n v. Clarke, No. 85-1489, slip op. at 8 (D.D.C. Mar. 10, 1987); Block v.
Pennsylvania Exchange Bank, 253 N.Y. 227, 170 N.E. 900 (1930); Letter from James E.
Smith, Comptroller of the Currency, [1973-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Bank. L. Rep. (CCH)
96,301, at 81,417; Symons, The "Business of Banking" in Historical Perspective, 51 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 676 (1983). It is important to emphasize that while the Comptroller's No-
Action Letter is helpful in determining how an oil-price swap operates, the Comptroller's opin-
ion under the National Bank Act is not dispositive of the issues under the Commodity Ex-
change Act.
9. Monroe, supra note 2.
10. Prior to receiving the No-Action Letter, supra note 8, on July 20, 1987, from the
Comptroller of the Currency, Chase paid an unidentified European firm to act as the interme-
diary in the swaps. Horowitz, Swap Product from Chase Draws Scrutiny, AMERICAN BANKER,
Apr. 23, 1987, at 2, col. 1. Since the issuance of the letter, however, Chase has acted as an
intermediary in two swap transactions. Originally, most of the swaps involved off-shore, non-
domestic firms. However, a number of American firms are now playing a role. Telephone inter-
view with Gaylen J. Byker, Director, Chase Manhattan Bank, Capital Markets Corp. (Sept.
23, 1987).
11. Monroe, supra note 2. Kelleway, Wall St. Creates a Long Hedge for Oil, Financial
Times, Apr. 2, 1987, at 36, col. 1.
12. Telephone interview with Gaylen J. Byker, Director, Chase Manhattan Bank, Capi-
tal Markets Corp. (Sept. 23, 1987).
13. Monroe, supra note 2.
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to pay the intermediary bank, periodically during a period of two to
five years, a fixed price14 for a fixed quantity of oil. In the same
agreement, the intermediary bank promises to pay the oil user the
variable price,1 5 as determined by a commodity price index, l" over
the same period of time for the same quantity of oil. 7 The oil user
benefits by entering into this agreement because the user is guaran-
teed a fixed price for the oil that it will consume during the length of
the agreement.' Concurrently, the intermediary bank protects itself
from unreasonable price fluctuations by entering into a second agree-
ment with an oil producer. 19
In this second agreement, the intermediary bank agrees to pay
the producer the fixed price of oil, and the producer agrees to pay
the bank the variable price.2" Thus, by entering into the second
agreement and receiving the variable price, the intermediary bank
has offset its original obligation to pay the oil user the variable price.
The oil producer benefits from this transaction because it is assured
of a constant cash inflow even if the price of oil drops drastically.2'
In exchange for this price protection, the oil producer foregoes
any potential profits that it could have recognized had the price of
oil risen. This lost profit, however, is a small price to pay for the
guarantee against the potential for major losses if prices should fall.
Similarly, the oil user foregoes any benefit should the price of oil fall
during the settlement period.22
Although both users and producers ultimately desire to buy or
sell the oil, no oil actually changes hands as a result of the swap.2"
As oil is needed by the user or refined for sale by the producer, these
participants actually enter the cash market to either buy or sell their
14. Kelleway, supra note 11. The fixed-price used in the swaps is negotiated and deter-
mined through a bid-offer quotation system. This fixed-price is determined at the time of the
initial agreement. Although, initially, getting the two sides to agree to a mutually acceptable
price was the bank's most difficult task, Chase officials state that this no longer poses much of
a problem because of the increase in the volume of interested participants. This will be even
less of a concern as the swaps gain in popularity and corporations learn of their usefulness. In
addition, price quotes for the fixed-price are available daily. Thus, there is a constant sampling
of the market. Telephone interview with Gaylen J. Byker, Director, Chase Manhattan, Capital
Markets Corp. (Sept. 23, 1987). See also infra note 154.
15. The variable price is the cash market price of oil.
16. See supra note 4.
17. Monroe, supra note 2.
18. Kelleway, supra note 11.
19. Monroe, supra note 2.
20. Id.
21. Kelleway, supra note 11.
22. The settlement period is the period of time between the effective date of the agree-
ment and its termination when the last payments are made.
23. Id. No-Action Letter, supra note 8, at 76,639.
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desired quantities. Any loss that is recognized in the cash market,
however, will then be reduced or offset by their swap position. For
example, if the index price24 increases during the settlement period,
then the oil user normally is forced to pay higher prices in the cash
market. With a swap agreement, however, because the index price
has increased, the intermediary bank pays the oil user the difference
between the variable rate and the fixed rate .2  Conversely, if the in-
dex price decreased, the oil user then would pay the intermediary
bank the difference.2  Thus, the oil user, in effect, pays the price
upon which it had initially agreed.
The intermediary bank's contract with the oil producer has an
equal but opposite effect. If the index price increases, the producer
pays the bank the difference, while, if the index price decreases, the
intermediary bank pays the producer the difference. In either case,
the producer is guaranteed to receive a fixed cash flow for its oil.
28
Any amount owed on either of the contracts is settled on a net basis
at the end of the settlement period."
Another attractive feature of oil-price swaps is the customized
nature of the instruments. 0 The intermediary bank analyzes the spe-
cific needs of each participant and tailors each swap to meet those
needs.3" The terms and conditions of the swaps are not standardized
but instead are negotiated individually.32 Generally, the average du-
ration of an oil-price swap is two to five years.33 Intermediary bank
officials expect, however, that as participants become more familiar
and accustomed to the instruments, this duration could expand to as
long as twelve or fifteen years. 4
24. The index price is also referred to as the variable price, spot index price or the cash
market price.
25. No-Action Letter, supra note 8, at 76,639. See also Kelleway, supra note 11.
26. No-Action Letter, supra note 8. See also Kelleway, supra note 11.
27. No-Action Letter, supra note 8. See also Kelleway, supra note 11.
28. Kelleway, supra note 11.
29. No-Action Letter, supra note 8. See also Kelleway, supra note 11.
30. Kelleway, supra note 11.
31. Telephone interview with Gaylen J. Byker, Director, Chase Manhattan Bank, Capi-
tal Markets Corp. (Sept. 23, 1987).
32. Virtually all of the terms of an oil-price swap are negotiated. These negotiated terms
include: initial date, termination date, fixed-price, index price, volume of oil, quality of oil,
settlement periods and settlement mechanism. Telephone interview with Gaylen J. Byker, Di-
rector, Chase Manhattan Bank, Capital Markets Corp. (Oct. 17, 1987).
33. Id.
34. Telephone interview with Gaylen J. Byker, Director, Chase Manhattan Bank, Capi-
tal Markets Corp. (Sept. 23, 1987). In determining the duration of such contracts, however,
participating banks will consider the creditworthiness as well as the needs of the participants.
For example, with the high percentage of airline turnovers, bankruptcies and dissolutions, an
intermediary is unlikely to allow an airline to enter into a swap for ten or fifteen years because
of the tremendous risk of default in the long term. Telephone interview with Gaylen J. Byker,
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Another significant attribute of an oil-price swap is its function
as a credit transaction."6 The bank, serving as the intermediary,
lends its own credit to each of the participants - oil users and pro-
ducers - by guarantying each party that the bank will receive pay-
ment in the event of default by the other party. 36 The. participants
have no "margin requirements."37 They are not required to put down
any amount of collateral to secure the transaction.3 8 As with any
lending transaction, the intermediary bank or lender performs an ex-
tensive credit risk analysis in order to minimize its exposure to de-
faults. 9 Thus, because any price risk is eliminated by the intermedi-
ary bank's offsetting positions, 0 the only risk absorbed by the bank
is the risk of default by the participants."1 To further minimize
credit risk exposure, the participants establish floor and ceiling limi-
tations for price index variation."' Thus, payments due from either
participant are never more than the amount calculated at the ceiling
or floor index price.4 s The participants therefore are assured of their
maximum cash flows and do not run the risk of unlimited price risk
that could ultimately lead to default. 4
Oil-price swaps are marketed to major corporations and com-
mercial institutions that deal with large quantities of oil and that are
knowledgeable about the risks associated with the buying and selling
of commodities. 5 Thus, these participants are not likely to fall vic-
tim to abuse or fraud. Further, these commercial institutions will
remain the major participants in oil-price swaps for several reasons.
Director, Chase Manhattan Bank, Capital Markets Corp. (Oct. 17, 1987).
35. Id. See supra note 34.
36. Telephone interview with Gaylen J. Byker, Director, Chase Manhattan Bank, Capi-
tal Markets Corp. (Sept. 23, 1987). The intermediary bank considers the worst case scenario
in order to determine its credit risk exposure: the amount that the intermediary bank would
owe the nondefaulting party in order to uphold and carry out the swap transaction. See gener-
ally No-Action Letter, supra note 8.
37. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
38. Id.
39. No-Action Letter, supra note 8, at 76,639.
40. For the bank to have offsetting positions, the two contracts of the swap must be
perfectly matched. An agreement is perfectly matched when each half of the swap agreement
that the intermediary bank enters into with the producers and users is exactly the same. Chase
officials state that unmatched swaps would leave the bank in a very risky and undesirable
position. Therefore, they intend to match all swap agreements. Telephone interview with Gay-
len J. Byker, Director, Chase Manhattan Bank, Capital Markets Corp. (Sept. 23, 1987). See
also No-Action Letter, supra note 8, at 76,638-39.




45. Telephone interview with Gaylen J. Byker, Director, Chase Manhattan Bank, Capi-
tal Markets Corp. (Sept. 23, 1987). These sophisticated entities include transportation compa-
nies, airlines, utilities, and chemical groups.
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First, banks will not serve as intermediaries in swap transactions and
expose themselves to default risk unless the participants are ex-
tremely creditworthy.4" Most likely, major corporations will be the
only enterprises that will meet the intermediary banks' credit stan-
dards.47 Second, in order for the transactions to be worthwhile to the
participants, the swaps must involve a substantial volume of oil.
Again, it is likely that only the major oil producers and users will
desire transactions involving such a substantial volume.4" Finally, in
addition to lending its good credit, the intermediary bank invests a
considerable amount of time in customizing the swaps to meet the
participants' needs and in performing a credit risk analysis. In return
for providing these services, the intermediary bank earns considera-
ble fees, which, in all likelihood, can be absorbed only by major
firms.49 These three factors naturally impose minimum size limita-
tions on the swap transactions. 50 Thus, it is likely that commercial
institutions will continue to be the participants in these price swaps.
Although oil-price swaps are not and cannot be bought or sold on
organized commodity exchanges because of their customized terms,
there are several ways for swap participants to offset their positions
should they desire to get out of an unfavorable contract. First, the
parties could mutually agree to terminate the contract. Second, a
party could unilaterally terminate the contract by defaulting and
then paying the nondefaulting party the present value of all future
adverse movement of the price of oil.5" Third, assuming there is a
relatively active secondary market, the defaulting party could pay
the intermediary bank the cost of creating an equivalent swap that
would replace the original swap.53 In addition, the party that wishes
to negate its position could enter into a subsequent swap position
that is equal but opposite to its original swap position. Although it
rarely occurs, offsetting of a swap position is a feasible alternative.
The contracts,however, are not freely transferable or assignable by
the participants themselves because the intermediary bank necessa-






51. Telephone interview with Gaylen J. Byker, Director, Chase Manhattan Bank, Capi-
tal Markets Corp. (Oct. 17, 1987).
52. Telephone interview with Gaylen J. Byker, Director, Chase Manhattan Bank, Capi-
tal Markets Corp. (Sept. 23, 1987).
53. Id. See also, Cates, Swap Financing, 20 INT'L LAW. 837, 841 (1986).
54. Telephone interview with Gaylen J. Byker, Director, Chase Manhattan Bank, Capi-
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intermediary bank needs assurance that participants have the requi-
site degree of creditworthiness."
Finally, although it appears that commodity price index swaps
are only promoted as hedging devices, the possibility exists that spec-
ulators56 may find the swaps attractive. In addition, the oil-price
swap market would function more efficiently if speculators did par-
ticipate, because increased volume would increase market liquidity. 7
In theory, the only difference between a speculative transaction and
a hedging transaction is the intention of the parties.58 Therefore, al-
though currently oil-price swaps primarily are used for hedging pur-
poses, it is possible that participants may enter the swap market with
speculative motives.
III. Are Oil-Price Swaps Securities That are Subject to Regulation
by the Securities and Exchange Commission?
While the emphasis of this Comment is primarily on the regula-
tion of oil-price swaps as commodity futures contracts, one must also
consider whether these instruments are securities. Classification of
oil-price swaps as securities would have several ramifications. First,
the issuance of the swaps would be subject to regulation by the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission.5 ' In addition, the CFTC, pursu-
ant to section 2(a)(B)(1)(V) of the Commodity Exchange Act
("CEA") would prohibit the trading of these instruments if they are
tal Markets Corp. (Oct. 17, 1987).
55. Id.
56. See generally Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 352, 357-
60 (1982). Speculators are persons who enter into transactions with the objective of achieving
profits through the successful anticipation of price movements. See Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d
283, 288 (2d Cir. 1980). See also supra note I. Thus, in oil-price swaps, speculators could
assume the role of either an oil user or an oil producer and, depending on their position,
anticipate that the price of oil would either increase or decrease.
57. See infra notes 188 & 192 and accompanying text.
58. Hedgers have an inherent interest in the cash market of the underlying commodity.
They ultimately desire to buy or sell the commodity in the cash market. Hedgers enter the
futures markets in order to protect themselves from adverse price fluctuations in the cash
market. Speculators, on the other hand, have no inherent interest in the commodity. They
merely assume the risks that hedgers are unwilling to take. In return for assuming these risks,
speculators hope to make profits based on their expectation of price changes. Leist, 638 F.2d at
287-88. See generally supra notes I & 56.
59. The SEC has jurisdiction to regulate issuance of securities and those who deal in
securities pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933. Section 2(l) of the Securities Act of 1933
defines the term "security" to include "any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evi-
dence of indebtedness, certificate of interest . . . investment contract . . . or in general, any
instrument commonly known as a "security." 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1982) (emphasis added).
Section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which involves regulation of ex-
changes and brokerage firm engaged in securities transaction, contains an almost identical
definition for the term "security." 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(10) (1982).
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traded pursuant to a contract for future delivery of the security. This
section of the CEA, in effect, prohibits a futures contract on a
security.
The Securities Act of 1933 defines the term "security" to in-
clude specific instruments that presumptively embody investment
characteristics.6 0 The Act further defines a "security" in broader
terms and provides that the term "security" includes an "investment
contract" or "evidence of indebtedness."61
In order for the swaps to constitute an investment contract, the
instruments must meet a four prong test set forth by the United
States Supreme Court in SEC v. W.S. Howey Co.6 2 This test, re-
ferred to as the Howey test, requires: (1) an investment of money;
(2) an expectation of profits to be derived from the investment; (3)
an investment made in a "common enterprise;" and (4) an expecta-
tion of profits based solely on the efforts of the promoter or third
party. 3
With regard to the first element, the Supreme Court recognized
in Howey that not every cash outlay represents an investment of
money.6" To determine which outlays constitute investments of
money, the Court focused on the intention of the parties and whether
they were attracted by the prospects of a return on their investment,
which is the second element of the test.6 5 The participants in oil-
price swaps, whether hedgers or speculators, participate in the trans-
actions because they want to make a profit. Hedgers hope to make
profits in order to cover any potential losses in the cash market.
Speculators hope to make profits by anticipating changes in the price
of oil. As a result, oil price swaps appear to meet the first two ele-
ments of the Howey test for investment contracts. The satisfaction of
elements three and four, however, is questionable..
There are two approaches to determining whether the third ele-
ment of the Howey test, the necessity of a common enterprise, has
been satisfied. These two approaches are vertical commonality 6 and
60. See generally H. SOWARDS, 11 - Part I BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS - SECURITIES
REGULATIONS - FEDERAL SECURITIES ACT § 2.01, at 2-3 (1987).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1) (1982).
62. 328 U.S. 293 (1945).
63. Id. at 298-99. Gilberg, supra note 5, at 1623. See also United Housing Foundation,
Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975) (refining the last element by requiring the expectation of
profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others).
64. United Housing, 421 U.S. at 831.
65. Id. at 852-54.
66. Brodt v. Bache, 595 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1978); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.,
497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir.
1974); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476, 482 n.7 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
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horizontal commonality.67 In general, vertical commonality exists
when an investor and a broker engage in a common venture without
regard to whether investors have pooled their funds." In contrast,
horizontal commonality exists when several investors jointly partici-
pate in a common venture. 69
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Milarnik v. M-
S Commodities70 first espoused the horizontal commonality ap-
proach. In Milarnik, the court reasoned that, if the outcome of an
investor's transaction is not dependent on another investor, there is
no horizontal commonality. 7' An oil price swap involves two inves-
tors, but horizontal commonality does not exist because one party's
success does not depend on the success of the other. The outcome of
one side of the swap has no direct effect on the profitability of the
other side of the swap. The intermediary bank owes each party a
specific sum of money regardless of the status of the other
agreement.
Oil price swaps also lack vertical commonality. In SEC v. Con-
tinental Commodities Corp., 2 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit reasoned that the fortuity of the investment must be essen-
tially dependent upon a promoter's expertise for vertical commonal-
ity to exist. Clearly, the success of an oil-price swap does not depend
on the expertise of the intermediary bank, the promoter of this trans-
action. The bank merely facilitates the transaction by serving as the
intermediary. The swap participants, who are sophisticated and in-
formed entities, do not rely on the bank's guidance for the success of
their investment. The two participants in the swap negotiate and
agree according to their own needs. Therefore, because oil-price
414 U.S. 821 (1973). See also Gilberg, supra note 5, at 1624-25.
67. Union Planter's Nat'l Bank v. Commercial Credit Business Loans, Inc., 651 F.2d
1174 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1124 (1981); Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561
F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1977); Milarnik v. M-S Commodities, 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 887 (1972).
68. Vertical commonality exists when the fortunes of the investors are interwoven with
and dependent upon the efforts and success of those seeking the investment of third parties.
SEC v. Glen W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476, 482 n.7 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821
(1973). See, e.g., SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974); see also
Gilberg, supra note 5, at 1625.
69. Milarnik, 457 F.2d at 276-77; see Gilberg, supra note 5, at 1624 n.113. A court will
find horizontal commonality when there is a "pooling" of funds of several investors. "When an
individual deposits a specific sum of money or securities with the knowledge and expectation
that the investment will be pooled with that of other similarly situated investors and that any
profits will be shared on a pro rata basis," then horizontal commonality is usually present.
Gilberg, supra note 5, at 1624.
70. 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
71. Id. at 277.
72. 497 F.2d 516, 522 (5th Cir. 1974).
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swaps lack both vertical and horizontal commonality, they do not
satisfy the third element of the Howey test.
Finally, oil-price swaps fail to staisfy the fourth element of the
Howey test because the participants do not have an expectation of
profits based solely on the efforts of a promoter or a third party. Any
profits that are earned are realized due to a change in market price.
Theoretically, no individual or group of individuals has any control
over price fluctuations.
Not only has the Supreme Court looked to the four elements of
the Howey test to determine whether an instrument constitutes a se-
curity, but the Court has also considered the purpose of the securi-
ties laws." The Court has recognized that "[tihe focus of the [Se-
curities] Act [of 1933] is on the capital market of the enterprise
system: the sale of securities to raise capital for profit-making pur-
poses, the exchanges on which securities are traded, and the need for
regulation to prevent fraud and to protect the interest of investors." '
Regulation of oil-price swaps would not promote these purposes be-
cause swap participants are not interested in raising capital for
profit-making purposes. Rather, these participants utilize swaps for
commercial purposes.
In addition, courts, in determining whether an instrument is a
security, consider whether the transaction has an investment or com-
mercial character."' If the instruments have a commercial character,
they are less likely to be considered securities.7" Oil producers and
users who participate in oil-price swaps do so for specific commercial
purposes. These participants seek to guard against unreasonable fluc-
tuations in the price of oil so that they can effectively manage their
cash flows and operations." Because these swaps meet a vital com-
mercial need and are not used for speculative purposes, they do not
appear to have the "investment" character of investment contracts.
If, however, speculators become active swap participants, the swaps
will take on more of an investment character and appear to be more
like securities.
Although it appears unlikely that oil-price swaps constitute in-
vestment contracts, they do constitute "evidence of indebtedness,"
because each participant is obligated to make payments to the inter-
73. See, e.g., United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975).
74. Id. at 849.
75. H. SOWARDS, supra note 60, at 2-22 to 2-23.
76. Id.
77. Firms cannot operate effectively if their cash inflows or outflows are unpredictable.
Oil-price swaps facilitate stable and predictable cash flows.
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mediary bank. Obviously, not every loan constitutes a security.
Therefore, the critical inquiry is whether these "evidences of indebt-
edness" are the type of investment that the securities laws were in-
tended to regulate. This issue, in most instances, turns on the "com-
mercial-investment dichotomy": whether the debt is acquired for
commercial or investment purposes.7s
Courts have developed three tests that address the "commercial-
investment dichotomy" issue.79 An analysis under each of the tests,
however, reveals that oil-price swaps are not the type of "evidence of
indebtedness" that the securities laws were intended to regulate. In
the first test, the Motivational Test, the court considers the partici-
pants' reasons for entering into the transaction. 80 In oil-price swaps,
the participants are commercial institutions seeking protection from
unreasonable fluctuations in the price of oil. Therefore, the commer-
cial attributes of the swap are more prevalent than the investment
attributes. Similarly, under the second test, the Investment-Commer-
cial Purpose Test, the court considers whether the participants have
specific commercial needs that they are attempting to achieve.81 Fi-
nally, under the third test, the Risk-Capital Test, the court considers
whether the participants have "contributed risk capital subject to the
'entrepreneurial' or managerial efforts of [others]. '"2 The capital
contributed in oil-price swaps is not subject to the managerial efforts
of others. Rather, the bank merely serves as an intermediary and
facilitates negotiation of the terms that effect the amount of contrib-
uted capital. The ability to hedge against price risks is critical in any
firm that constantly buys and sells commodities. Oil-price swaps are
merely ordinary commercial transactions that allow an entity to
hedge against price risks. Therefore, oil-price swaps are not "evi-
dence of indebtedness" as defined by the securities laws.
Even if oil-price swaps were classified as securities, however,
they would most likely fall within the Private Offering Exemption."'
The premise of this exemption is that sophisticated and informed
participants in a transaction do not need the special protections af-
78. Gilberg, supra note 5, at 1626; Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689, 695 (3d
Cir. 1973).
79. Gilberg, supra note 5, at 1626.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. See also United Cal. Bank v. THC Finance Corp., 557 F.2d 1351, 1358 (9th
Cir. 1977); Great W. Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1257 (9th Cir. 1976).
83. Section 4(c) of the Securities Act of 1933. 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1982), exempts from
registration "transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering." See SEC v. Ralston
Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953); SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1980).
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forded by the securities laws. 84 The Securities Act of 1933 was en-
acted to ensure disclosure of material facts relating to the issuance
of investments. 85 When the investors have access to this information
regardless of the Act's protections, regulation is not necessary.
The following factors are considered in determining whether the
Private Offering Exemption applies:88 "1. the number of offerees; 2.
the sophistication of the offerees [and their ability to gain access to
information]; 3. the site and manner of the offering; and 4. the rela-
tionship of the offerees to the issue."' 87 The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in SEC v. Murphy88 stated that "an offering to those
who are shown to be able to fend for themselves is a transaction 'not
involving any public offering.'"89 Currently, Chase Manhattan Bank
markets the swaps only to major oil producers and users who have
an interest in the underlying commodity.9 Presumably, these firms
are experts in the oil business and, more specifically, in oil pricing.
In addition, they presumably have access to all information neces-
sary to make informed decisions and are aware of the risks associ-
ated with commodity prices. Therefore, swap participants do not
need the protections afforded by the securities laws. 91 If, however,
speculators do become active participants despite the intermediary
banks' efforts to limit the transactions to hedgers, then there is a
strong likelihood that less informed entities will participate in oil-
price swaps. Should the public become involved, whether by transfer
or assignment of a swap position or by direct participation, the Pri-
vate Offering Exemption would not apply.
In general, the smaller the number of offerees, the more "non-
84. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. at 125. "[Tlhe applicability of... [the private offer-
ing exemption] should run on whether the particular class of persons affected needs the protec-
tion of the Act. An offering to those who are shown to be able to fend for themselves is a
transaction 'not involving any public offering.'" Id.
85. The purpose of the Securities Act is to protect investors by promoting full disclosure
of information necessary to informed investment decisions. Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. at 124.
See also Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
86. See SEC Release No. 4552, 27 Fed. Reg. 11316 (Nov. 6, 1962); Ralston Purina
Co., 346 U.S. at 119; Schimer v. Webster, 225 A.2d 880 (D.C. Ct. App. 1976); Annotation,
What Constitutes a Public Offerings within the Meaning of Section 4(2) of the Securities Act
of 1933, 6 A.L.R. FED. 536 (1971); see generally H. SOWARDS, supra note 60, § 4.02, at 4-26.
87. SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 645 (9th Cir. 1980).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 644 (quoting SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953)). See also
SEC Release No. 33-6274 (Dec. 23, 1980) (regarding "institutional-type" individuals "with
sufficient experience, expertise, and financial clout to protect their own interest and who do not
need the SEC to obtain adequate information about a company in which they invest - they
can get this information themselves."). Gilberg, supra note 5, at 1630 n.140.
90. Telephone interview with Gaylen J. Byker, Director, Chase Manahattan Bank, Cap-
ital Markets Corp. (Oct. 17, 1987).
91. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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public" the instrument appears. In each unique swap transaction,
there are only two participants or offerees - an oil user and an oil
producer. Although the courts have not established an absolute num-
ber of offerees that would determine the availability or unavailability
of the exemption,92 a swap transaction involving only two offerees
most likely falls within the Private Offering Exemption. Addition-
ally, another relevant inquiry in determining whether the Private Of-
fering Exemption applies is the "manner of the offering.""3 In an oil-
price swap, the intermediary bank does not advertise the swaps to
the general public. Rather, the intermediary bank markets the swaps
to existing clients and other selected commercial institutions. " Such
limited marketing also supports the conclusion that oil-price swaps
fall within the Private Offering Exemption.
IV. Are Oil-Price Swaps Commodity Futures Contracts that Are
Subject to Regulation by the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission?
The CFTC has, pursuant to the Commodity Exchange Act
(CEA), 95 exclusive jurisdiction over "transactions involving contracts
of sale of a commodity9  for future delivery. ' 97 The Commission's
jurisdiction stems from the need to maintain integrity in the futures
market and to protect the public.98 Section 4(a)99 of the Commodity
92. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953).
93. See generally H. SOWARDS, supra note 60, § 4.02[l], at 4-34.2.
94. Telephone interview with Gaylen J. Byker, Director, Chase Manhattan Bank, Capi-
tal Markets Corp. (Oct. 17, 1987).
95. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982). The CEA is a "comprehensive regulatory structure to over-
see the volatile and esoteric futures trading complex." H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
1 (1974). S. REP. No. 850, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, 13 (1978).
96. "Commodity" is broadly defined to include specifically enumerated commodities as
well as "all other goods and articles, except onions ... and all services, rights, and interests in
which contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in." CEA § 2(a)(l)(A),
7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
97. Id.
98. The CFTC's regulatory scheme is "designed to assure the public of honest and or-
derly futures trading, and to prevent price manipulation, fraud and sudden or unreasonable
price fluctuations in commodity prices." Leist, 638 F.2d at 328. See also CEA § 3, 7 U.S.C. §
5 (1982). See also S. REP. No. 850, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1978).
99. Section 4(a) of the CEA appeared in its original form in the Futures Trading Act,
Pub. L. No. 66-67, ch. 86, § 4, 42 Stat. 187 (1921) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 6), and
fell under the federal taxing power. This law imposed a regulatory tax on all grain futures
contracts unless the contracts were marketed through a designated board of trade. This version
of the Act, however, was declared unconstitutional in Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922), as
an illegal exercise of the taxing power.
The original Act was subsequently amended by the Grain Futures Act of 1922. Section
4(a), as amended, eliminated all tax provisions but flatly prohibited any person from dealing in
futures contracts unless the contract was marketed on a board of trade designated as a con-
tract market. Grain Futures Act of 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-311, ch. 369, 1 4, 42 Stat. 998, 999
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Exchange Act mandates that all futures contracts be traded on a
designated board of trade 00 by a member of the contract market.101
Cash forward contracts,02 however, are one exception to the Com-
mission's jurisdiction.' The CEA provides that the term "future de-
livery" shall not include "any sale of any cash commodity for de-
ferred shipment or delivery."'' 0 4 Therefore, under the CEA, if oil-
price swaps are futures contracts, they must be traded on an ex-
change. If, however, the swaps are forward contracts, the intermedi-
ary banks may continue marketing them off-exchange. The CEA
does not further define these terms. Therefore, one must examine
case law and the CFTC's interpretations to determine the elements
of a futures contract and a forward contract.
Oil-price swaps pose a jurisdictional challenge to the Commis-
sion because they possess characteristics of both futures contracts
and forward contracts. Although in the past the CFTC's position has
been firm in requiring futures to be traded on an exchange, there
appears to be some softening of its positions in light of the recent
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 6). This Act was recognized as a lawful exercise of the
Commerce Power in Chicago Bd. of Trade v. Olson, 262 U.S. 1 (1923). Although in 1936 the
Act was renamed the Commodity Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 74-675, ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491,
and there have been subsequent amendments to the Act as a whole, section 4(a) has remained
essentially unchanged since 1936. One such amendment involved the creation of an indepen-
dent agency, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, which assumed the regulatory du-
ties previously performed by the Department of Agriculture. Commodity Futures Trading
Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (1974).
100. The term "board of trade" is defined in section 2(a)(1)(A) of the CEA as "any
exchange or association, whether incorporated or unincorporated, of persons who shall be en-
gaged in the business of buying or selling any commodity or receiving the same for sale on
consignment." 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
101. The Commission will not designate a board of trade as a contract market for a
specific commodity unless the exchange can show that the contract serves as either a basis for
determining prices or that the contract can reasonably be expected to serve as a hedging tool.
17 C.F.R. pt. 5, App. A, § c(l)-(2) (1986).
102. For a discussion of cash forward contracts see infra notes 136-46 and accompany-
ing text. Cash forward contracts are within the scope of futures contracts. Congress, however,
carved out this exception for private parties who contemplate physical delivery of a commodity
but who delay or defer delivery for reasons of commercial convenience or necessity.
103. Another exception, known as the "Treasury Amendment," encompasses transac-
tions in foreign currency and other specified financial instruments that are traded among banks
and other sophisticated and informed institutions. See CFTC Statutory Interpretation, Trading
in Foreign Currencies for Future Delivery, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,963 (Oct. 23, 1985). See infra
notes 172-78 and accompanying text. In 1978 Congress created a second exemption for "Trade
Options." Trade options are off-exchange options on physical commodities where both parties
to the transaction are entering the transaction as part of their commodity related business. 50
Fed. Reg. 39,659 (Sept. 30, 1985). See 17 C.F.R. § 32.4(a) (1986). S. REP. No. 850, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1978). The CFTC limited this exemption solely to hedging activities.
CFTC Interpretive Letter No. 84-7, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
22,025, 28,593 (Feb. 22, 1984).
104. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
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developments in the financial futures arena.1"5 The CFTC, although
apparently recognizing the need for flexibility, is entrusted with the
duty and obligation to administer the CEA, which mandates that
futures contracts be traded on an exchange."'
The overriding proposition emerging from case law defining a
futures contract is that contracts must be analyzed as a whole by
taking into consideration the surrounding circumstances and inten-
tion of the parties. Consequently, the focus of the analysis is the eco-
nomic reality of the contract rather than the label given to the in-
strument by the broker or developer of the instrument.1 0 7 The
ultimate question is whether the contract substantially serves "the
same function as [an] exchange-traded futures contract. 10 8 In addi-
tion to these considerations, however, any analysis involving federal
regulation must address the legislative intent behind the regulation.
The legislative history of the CEA reveals that the "fundamental
purpose of the CEA is to ensure fair practice and honest dealing on
105. Concrete evidence of the CFTC's changing philosophy is an Interpretive Letter
issued in June 1986. CFTC-OGC Interpretive Letter No. 86-5, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,227 at 32,616 (1986). This interpretation, for the first time,
permitted an off-exchange futures transaction regardless of whether it violated the CEA.
White & Stein, supra note 5, at 343. Although this interpretation covered a very specific
factual setting, it nonetheless evidences the possible development of a more flexible philosophy.
While CFTC officials are unwilling to take a stand on the swap issue at this time, Former
Chairman Susan Phillips stated that "the swaps are the first test of a new philosophy at the
CFTC that off-exchange instruments may be necessary in some cases for competition." CFTC
Has Legal Concerns About Chase Manhattan's New Oil-Price Swaps, SECURITIES WEEK,
Apr. 13, 1987, at 18. Phillips also stated: "Regulators should be responsive and flexible if
needs change . . . . We do not wish to inhibit capital formation." Owen, Over the Counter,
Round the Law, Financial Times, Mar. 19, 1987, at 13, col. 1. In addition, the new chairman
of the CFTC, Wendy Lee Gramm, appears to have a progressive, flexible approach to regula-
tion, and such an approach may have a significant impact on the regulation of off-exchange
instruments. Wendy L. Gramm was sworn in as Chairman of the CFTC on February 22,
1988.
See generally Architzel and Tosini, A Framework for Current Issues Regarding Off-Ex-
change Instruments, 7 COMMODITIES LAW LETTER 3(4) Apr. 1987. Chase officials also state
that if the swaps are prohibited in the United States, then foreign competitors will realize a
competitive advantage over domestic enterprises. Telephone interview with Gaylen J. Byker,
Director, Chase Manhattan Bank, Capital Markets Corp. (Sept. 23, 1987).
106. CFTC Has Legal Concerns About Chase Manhattan's New Oil-Price Swaps, SE-
CURITIES WEEK, Apr. 13, 1987, at 18. Speaking to off-exchange transactions in general, of
which oil-price swaps are one type, CFTC Commissioner Robert Davis stated that "[tihe
agency, CFTC, must decide how to follow the law without inhibiting or prohibiting other ac-
tivities helpful to capital formation and economic efficiency." Karr, Climb in Off-Exchange
Futures Sales Challenges CFTC, Wall St. J., Mar. 3, 1987, at 10, col. 1. In addition, Mar-
shall Hanbury, General Counsel for the CFTC, stated that "[t]he main problem is that under
the [CEA], futures contracts are supposed to be traded on an exchange." CFTC Has Legal
Concerns About Chase Manhattan's New Oil-Price Swaps, SECURITIES WEEK, Apr. 13, 1987,
at 18.
107. CFTC v. U.S. Metals Depository Co., 468 F. Supp. 1149, 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
108. In re First Nat'l Monetary Corp., [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 22,698, at 30,976 (CFTC Aug. 7, 1985).
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the commodity exchanges and to provide a measure of control over
those forms of speculative activity which too often demoralize the
markets to the injury of producers and consumers and the exchanges
themselves . .1.0."'9 In addition, the CEA states explicitly that reg-
ulation is necessary to protect interstate commerce and to serve the
national public interest."' With these basic premises in mind, it is
appropriate to examine the commodity law that defines futures con-
tracts and exempted forward contracts.
A. Elements of Futures and Forward Contracts
1. What Constitutes a Futures Contract?-In general, a com-
modity futures contract is a standardized contract to buy or sell, at a
later date, a specified quantity of a commodity at a predetermined
price."' A futures contract culminates with either physical delivery
or cash settlement."12 Because the CEA does not define the terms
"futures contract"" 3 or "forward contract," the CFTC and federal
case law have further defined and articulated the difference between
the two types of contracts. The CFTC in In re Stovall"4 found that
futures contracts of specified commodities typically have standard-
109. See H.R. REP. 421, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2 (1935); S. REP. No. 850, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 12 (1978). See 78 CONG. REC. 2264 (1934). See also Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283,
335 (2d Cir. 1980).
110. Section 3 of the CEA provides as follows:
Transactions in commodities involving the sale thereof for future delivery as
commonly conducted on boards of trade and known as "futures" are affected
with a national public interest. Such futures transactions are carried on in large
volume by the public . . . .The transactions and prices of commodities on such
boards of trade are susceptible to excessive speculation and can be manipulated,
controlled,. . . to the detriment of the producer or the consumer..., rendering
regulation imperative for the protection of such [interstate] commerce and the
national public interest therein.
7 U.S.C. § 5 (1982).
11. Precious Metals Assoc. Inc. v. CFTC, 620 F.2d 900, 905 (1st Cir. 1980); CFTC v.
Commercial Petrolera Internacional, S.A., 548 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Leist, 638 F.2d
at 286; CFTC GLOSSARY OF TRADING TERMS, at 15; Crisman & Wierzinski, The CFTC:
Hedging Against the Futures Boom, Vol. 6, No. 4 THE DISTRICT LAWYER 32 (Mar./Apr.
1982).
112. CFTC v. Commercial Petrolera Internacional, S.A., 548 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y.
1981); Leist, 638 F.2d at 286.
113. The CEA does not actually use or define the term "futures contract." The Act
merely refers to those contracts as "contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery." 7
U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
114. [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,941, at 23, 775
(CFTC Dec. 6, 1979). See also CFTC Office of the General Counsel Statutory Interpretation,
What Constitutes a Futures Contract? 44 Fed. Reg. 13,493, reprinted in [1977-1980 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,772, at 23,157 (Mar. 12, 1979). This interpretation
analyzes the characteristics of leverage contracts and the legislative history of what constitutes
a futures contract before determining that leverage contracts are futures contracts. This legis-
lative history was analyzed by the Commission in Stovall.
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ized terms and conditions with the exception of price. "1 5 They are
frequently bought and sold by the general public." 6 In addition, a
good faith deposit - margin money" 7 - is normally secured to pro-
tect against adverse price changes. The court in CFTC v. National
Coal Exchange, Inc."8 found that the following characteristics are
also indicative of a futures contract: (1) "specified future delivery
provisions;" (2) "price determination at time of agreement;" (3)
"opportunity for offset or extinguishment of delivery obligations;"
(4) "price quotation system and competitive market trading;" and
115. Stovall [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,941, at
23,776. See also Leist, 638 F.2d at 286. Standardization of terms promotes economic effi-
ciency by facilitating exchange trading and allowing futures participants to offset their futures
positions by entering into a contract which is equal, but opposite to their original position.
Breyer v. FNMC, 548 F. Supp. 955, 963 (D.N.J. 1982). Although standardization is recog-
nized as facilitating an offsetting transaction, it is not necessary that the offsetting be accom-
plished in the identical manner as an exchange-traded contract. In re FNMC, [1984-1986
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,698, at 30,975 (CFTC Aug. 7, 1985).
The price of a futures contract for a specific commodity is established at the time the
contracts are made by an open out-cry system. Thus, exchange trading of futures contracts
facilitate price discovery. Price discovery is the creation of publicly known, uniform prices for
commodities at any point in time. H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 132 (1974). Con-
gress has determined that centralized pricing is an important part of a competitive economy
"since price is the catalyst which facilitates the allocation of goods among potential users and
distributes output most efficiently." Id.
116. Stovall, 1 20,941, at 23,777. See also CFTC Interpretive Letter No. 77-11, Juris-
diction Over Dealers in GNMA Securities, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 20,466, at 21,907 (Aug. 17, 1977). The Staff of the Office of General Counsel found
that when forward contracts lose their essentially private nature and concern the public, the
contracts are subject to Commission regulation as contracts for future delivery.
In addition, "the requirement that a futures contract be executed on a designated contract
market is what makes the contract legal, and not what makes it a futures contract." Stovall,
20,941, at 23,779. Therefore, the court rejects the argument that an instrument is not a fu-
tures contract because it is not traded on an exchange. Id. at 23,779.
117. Stovall, 1 20,941, at 23,777. The CFTC GLOSSARY OF TRADING TERMS defines
"margin money" as follows:
Margin money is the amount of money or collateral deposited by a cus-
tomer with his broker, by a broker with a clearing member, or by a clearing
member with the clearing house, for the purpose of insuring the broker or clear-
ing-house against loss on open futures contracts. The margin is not partial pay-
ment on a purchase. (1) Original or initial margin is the total amount of margin
per contract requirement by the broker when a futures position is opened; (i.e.
the futures investor is required at the initiation of the transaction to put down
only a small portion of the total cost of the futures contract. Such highly lever-
aged transactions increase profit potential because a smaller amount of money
can be used to earn the profit. Conversely, highly leveraged transactions dramat-
ically increase loss potential.) (2) Maintenance margin is a sum which must be
maintained on deposit at all times. If a customer's equity in any futures position
drops to or under the level because of adverse price movement, the broker must
issue a margin call to restore the customer's equity.
CFTC GLOSSARY OF TRADING TERMS, at 19. In addition, the amount of margin required is
usually determined as a fixed percentage of the total contract price. Id.
118. [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,424, at 26,046
(W.D. Tenn. May 7, 1982).
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(5) "transferability of risk." 9
The primary purpose of a futures contract is to shift or assume
the risks associated with fluctuations in commodity prices.120 In
Stovall, the CFTC emphasized that the purpose is usually not the
transferring of ownership of the actual commodities.12 1 Rather, in
the majority of transactions, the parties to a futures contract liqui-
date their positions and "legal obligations to make or take delivery
by offsetting122 their contracts with equal and opposite transactions
prior to the date" when their legal obligations arise.2
In CFTC v. Co Petro Marketing Group, Inc.,24 the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered additional factors in the
definition of a futures contract. The court explained that because the
participants in the transaction had neither the intention nor the ca-
pacity to take delivery of the underlying commodity, a futures con-
tract existed.' 25 The court further considered one additional element
in its analysis - the inherent value of the commodity to the par-
ties. 26 The court explained that there is additional support for a
finding of a futures contract when there is no inherent value of the
commodity to the parties and the participants have nothing to gain
by taking delivery of large quantities of the commodity.
2
Standardization of contract terms is another significant element
of a futures contract. 28 In determining whether a contract is stan-
dardized, courts consider the following terms: quantity, quality, de-
livery date, delivery point, handling fees, commodity specifications,
and procedures for giving notice of intention to make or take deliv-
ery of the physical commodity. 2 9 Complete standardization, how-
119. Id. at 26,053.
120. Stovall, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 20,941, at
23,777. A party who shifts risk is referred to as a hedger while a party who assumes the risk is
called a speculator. See supra note 1. See generally Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v.
Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1981).
121. Stovall, 1 20,941, at 23,777.
122. A position in the futures market is offset by purchasing or selling a futures contract
that is equal, but exactly opposite, to the original futures position.
123. Stovall, 1 20,941, at 23,777. The House Report to the 1974 amendments to the
CEA states that "only about three percent of all futures contracts traded are normally settled
by actual delivery." H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. at 149 (1974).
124. 680 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1982).
125. Id. at 578.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
129. Co Petro, 680 F.2d at 579-80; Breyer v. FNMC, 548 F. Supp. 955, 963 (D.N.J.
Sept. 9, 1982); CFTC v. Commercial Petrolera Internacional, S.A., [1980-1982 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,222, at 25,096 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1981); In re
Stovall, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,941, at 23,778-79
(CFTC Dec. 6, 1979).
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ever, is not required for a finding that an agreement is a futures
contract. 130
Courts and the CFTC also give significant weight to whether a
contract is issued to the general public or to sophisticated institu-
tions."3  This factor is consistent with the legislative intent underly-
ing the CEA, for one purpose of the Act is to protect the interests of
the general public.132 Presumably, sophisticated institutions can fend
for themselves. 133
The CFTC further refined the definition of a futures contract in
Habas v. American Board of Trade, Inc.' In Habas, the CFTC
stated that even though a contract possesses some of the characteris-
tics of a futures contract, those characteristics by themselves may
not be sufficient to classify the contract as a futures contract. The
CFTC instead considered whether there was sufficient "evidence to
support a 'finding that. . .[the] contracts, when viewed as a whole,
serve substantially the same function as exchange-traded futures
contracts: providing participants with an opportunity to assume or
shift the risk of price changes in an underlying commodity without
the forced burden of delivery.' ""'
2. What Constitutes a Forward Contract?-In general, a for-
ward contract is a cash transaction in which the merchandise con-
tracted for is not to be delivered immediately, but rather on an
agreed upon future date. 36 Thus, in a forward contract, the "deliv-
ery" of the commodity is deferred rather than the "agreement to buy
or sell." Unlike futures contracts, a cash forward contract involves a
seller who is capable of making delivery and a buyer who has the
ability of taking delivery of all commodities for which he has con-
tracted.137 Both parties to the contract expect that delivery of the
130. The court in Co Petro found that standardized volume units and delivery dates
were enough to facilitate off-setting transactions and, therefore, were sufficiently standardized
to meet the standardization element of a futures contract. Co Petro, 680 F.2d at 580.
131. Stovall, 20,941, at 23,778; Co Petro, 680 F.2d at 579; CFTC v. National Coal
Exchange, Inc., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 21,424, at 26,050
(W.D. Tenn. May 7, 1982).
132. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
133. See National Coal, V 21,424, at 26,050.
134. [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,150, at 32,372
(CFTC July 11, 1986).
135. Id. at 32,373.
136. HR. REp. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 129 (1974). See also Schneider, The For-
ward Contract Exclusion. An Analysis of Off-Exchange Commodity-Based Instruments, 41
Bus. LAw 853 (May 1986).
137. In re Stovall, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. V 20,941, at
23,777 (CFTC Dec. 6, 1979).
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commodities will actually take place and that the commodities con-
tracted for will actually change hands."' In order for a transaction
to constitute a forward contract, "the contract must be a binding
agreement on both parties to the contract: one must agree to make
delivery and the other to take delivery of the commodity."" 9 The
significance of this forward contract exception to CFTC regulation is
that it allows delivery of a commodity" 0 to be deferred for purposes
of commercial convenience or necessity without forcing the partici-
pants to transact on the commodities exchange"' or to be subjected
to regulation by the CFTC. Thus, forward contracts are essentially
commercial transactions.
The major difference between forward contracts and futures
contracts is that forward contracts "entail not only the legal obliga-
tion to perform, but also the generally fulfilled expectation that the
contract will lead to the exchange of commodities for money. In con-
trast, parties to a futures contract do not usually expect delivery and
it rarely occurs.""4
The court in Co Petro further defined and emphasized the nar-
rowness of the cash forward exception." 3 Looking to the legislative
history of the CEA, the court noted that in the Senate floor debate,
Senator Capper, the sponsor of the Senate version of the Bill, stated:
The bill [that regulates futures contracts] does not concern
itself at all with the sale or purchase of actual grain, either for
present or future delivery. The entire business of buying and
selling the actual grain is excluded. The bill deals only with the
"future" or "pit" transactions in which the transfer of actual
grain is not contemplated."'
In addition, the court in Co Petro considered whether the par-
ticipants, members of the general public, were "unsophisticated" in
commodity transactions." 5 The court concluded that members of the
general pubiic were unsophisticated and needed the protection af-
forded by the regulated contract markets and registration
138. CFTC v. Co Petro Marketing Group, Inc., 680 F.2d 573, 578 (9th Cir. 1982).
139. CFTC-OGC Interpretive Statement, Characteristics Distinguishing Cash and For-
ward Contracts and 'Trade' Options, 50 Fed. Reg. 39,656, 39,657 (1985).
140. A commodity can be delivered by cash settlement. See infra notes 159-64 and ac-
companying text.
141. Stovall, 1 20,941, at 23,778. In this case, the court discusses the legislative history
of the forward contract exclusion. H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120-30 (1974).
142. Stovall, 20,941, at 23,778.
143. CFTC v. Co Petro Marketing Group, Inc., 680 F.2d 573, 577-79 (9th Cir. 1982).
144. 61 CONG. REc. 4762 (1921). See also CFTC v. Co Petro Marketing Group, Inc.,
680 F.2d 573, 578 n.6 (9th Cir. 1982).
145. Co Petro, 680 F.2d at 579.
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requirements."0
B. Oil-Price Swaps: Forward or Futures Contracts?
The classification of an instrument as a futures contract essen-
tially depends on a case-by-case analysis of whether the instrument
possesses sufficient futures-like characteristics. 14 7  There are, how-
ever, additional considerations that must be considered in determin-
ing whether oil-price swaps constitute futures contracts.
1. Futures Analysis.-Although the weight of the evidence
supports the conclusion that oil-price swaps are forward rather than
futures contracts, there are valid arguments that support the finding
of a futures contract. First, oil-price swaps serve substantially the
same function as exchange-traded futures contracts. They allow par-
ticipants to hedge or shift the risks associated with fluctuations in
commodity prices.1 4 8 In addition, it is likely that speculators will find
these instruments attractive."' Although the intermediary banks
may attempt to impose restrictions that exclude speculators from
participation in the swaps, it is unlikely that such restrictions could
be adequately enforced. Therefore, like futures contracts, oil-price
swaps may prove to be advantageous and attractive to speculators.
146. Id. See Schneider, supra note 136, at 879 n.126. See, e.g., CFTC v. Int'l Bullion
Clearing Corp., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,675 at 26,595
(W.D. Tex. Dec. 15, 1982).
147. CFTC v. National Coal Exchange, Inc., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut.
L. Rep. (CCH) 1 21,424, at 26,054 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 7, 1982).
148. This process is referred to as hedging. See supra note 1. While used as a hedging
tool, participants in both oil-price swaps and futures contracts use profits made in these trans-
actions to offset any additional costs or losses incurred in the cash commodity market when
they actually buy and sell the commodities. For example, in a futures transaction, a buyer,
anticipating the price of a commodity may increase, buys futures contracts. If the price in-
creases, he then sells the futures contracts at a higher price and recognizes a profit in the
futures market. Although he must then pay a higher price in the cash market when he actually
buys the goods, this additional cost will be offset by the profit realized in the futures transac-
tion. Conversely, a seller, anticipating that the price of a commodity may fall, sells a futures
contract. If the spot price falls, then he buys back the futures contracts at a lower price and
realizes a profit. This profit then offsets the decreased revenues it recognizes in the cash mar-
ket when it actually sells the commodity.
Like futures contracts, oil-price swaps involve buyers (users) and sellers (producers) of a
commodity. The oil user, anticipating that the price of oil may rise, contracts to pay a fixed
price for the oil and to receive the variable price. If the price increases, the user realizes a
profit because the bank pays the user the difference between the fixed and variable prices.
Therefore, when the user enters the oil spot market to actually buy the oil, the increased
expenses from the rise in the oil will be offset by the profits realized in the swap transaction.
Conversely, the oil producer, fearing prices will fall, contracts to receive the fixed rate and to
pay the variable rate. If prices fall, the bank pays the producer the difference. This profit then
offsets the losses incurred in the spot market when it actually sold the oil. See generally supra
note 1.
149. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
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Additionally, oil-price swaps, like futures contracts, allow par-
ticipants to offset their positions. Typical futures contracts have stan-
dardized terms that facilitate offsetting on exchanges so that partici-
pants are not required to take or make delivery of the commodity.
Participants in nonstandardized oil-price swaps may also offset or
neutralize their positions, although not quite as easily, if they desire
to get out of an unfavorable contract.15
Also supporting the conclusion that oil-price swaps are futures
contracts is the absence of the intention of the parties to make or
take delivery of the underlying commodity. The underlying commod-
ity in an oil-price swap appears to be oil. The term "commodity,"
however, is broadly defined to include tangible commodities, such as
oil, as well as intangible goods.' 51 Therefore, as will be discussed, it
is possible that the parties contemplate delivery of an intangible
commodity such as, in this case, a commodity price index.
In addition, oil-price swaps, like futures contracts, involve mar-
ket price determination at the time of the agreement and facilitate
price discovery.' 52 Although the swaps do not involve the open out-
cry system' 53 characteristic of futures contracts, they do involve a
type of personalized negotiation system that facilitates collection of
quotations for the "fixed price" component of oil-price swaps.' 54 In
addition, the "variable price" component is based on a market index,
which closely approximates the true price of oil. Both the "variable
price" and "fixed-price" components therefore are established by the
market.
A final factor to be considered is the type of participants in-
volved in oil-price swaps. Although members of the general public
are not currently participants in the swaps, if the public should ulti-
mately become involved either through assignment, transfer, or di-
rect participation, 55 that public involvement would weigh heavily in
150. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
151. The term "commodity" includes all goods and articles, except onions, and "all ser-
vices, rights, and interests in which contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future
dealt in." 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(l)(A) (1982).
152. Price discovery is the creation of publicly known, uniform prices of commodities at
any point in time. H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 129, at 132 (1974).
153. "Open out-cry" is the method of public auction used for price determination and
which is the required pricing mechanism in the trading pits or rings of commodity exchanges.
Traders make public bids and offers in the trading pits such that the public has complete
access to the quotations and a means of pricing their own goods. CFTC GLOSSARY OF TRAD-
ING TERMS 21.
154. This system involves intermediaries which, on a daily basis, gather fixed-price quo-
tations from interested participants. Telephone interview with Gaylen J. Byker, Director,
Chase Manhattan Bank, Capital Markets Corp. (Sept. 17, 1987).
155. Depending on the terms of the agreement and limitations imposed by the interme-
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finding a futures contract.156
2. Forward Exemption Analysis.-Although oil-price swaps
possess some characteristics of a futures contract, the weight of the
evidence supports the conclusion that oil-price swaps are forward
contracts exempt from regulation by the CFTC. First, the terms of
the swap are privately negotiated and necessarily customized to meet
the needs of the participants. Consequently, the swaps cannot be
freely traded like futures contracts. Although it is theoretically possi-
ble for swap participants to offset their positions, such offsetting, un-
like futures contracts, is seldom accomplished and certainly not in-
tended at the outset.157
Swaps are currently entered into by sophisticated institutions
for commercial purposes, rather than by the general public. This fact
strongly supports the conclusion that oil-price swaps are not futures
contracts. If, however, oil-price swaps are entered into for specula-
tive purposes, it is likely that they will be subject to regulation. 158 In
addition, the margin payments required in futures contracts are not
required in oil-price swaps. Instead, the swaps function as commer-
cial credit transactions with the creditworthiness of the individual
participants securing the transactions.
While the above-mentioned factors support the conclusion that
oil-price swaps are not futures contracts, the most difficult aspect of
this analysis is the requirement of forward contracts that delivery of
the commodity is actually contemplated and actually occurs. Al-
though the typical forward contract involves delivery of a physical
commodity such as oil, the CEA broadly defines the term "commod-
ity"159 to include intangible as well as tangible commodities. There-
fore, it is feasible that the underlying commodity is the intangible
diary, the general public could feasibly become oil-price swap participants. First, current par-
ticipants could assign or transfer their rights under the agreement to a member of the general
public. In addition, if the swap market is nonliquid, the intermediary may find it necessary to
have members of the public serve as participants. It is important to stress that these alterna-
tives will depend on the express terms of the individual agreements. Chase Manhattan Bank,
in its request for a No-Action Letter, has stated that it intends to limit participants to non-
public entities with legitimate hedging needs. No-Action Letter, supra note 8, at 76,639.
156. The degree of public involvement is an important consideration because of the
stated purpose of the CEA. See supra notes 98, 109, 110 and accompanying text.
157. Telephone interview with Gaylen J. Byker, Director, Chase Manhattan Bank, Cap-
ital Markets Corp. (Sept. 17, 1987).
158. The court in Co Petro noted that there was nothing in the legislative history sur-
rounding cash forward contracts that showed Congress' intention to extend the forward con-
tract exemption to speculative transactions. CFTC v. Co Petro Marketing Group, Inc., 680
F.2d 573, 574 (9th Cir. 1982).
159. See supra note 96.
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"commodity price index." 160 Such an index is a reflection of value
rather than a right to ownership.16 Thus, the underlying commodity
that is subsequently delivered is the value of the index. 62 Accord-
ingly, delivery of a "value" can be accomplished only by delivery of
cash or a cash equivalent.' 63 Thus, in a transaction involving an in-
tangible commodity, whether a futures contract or a forward con-
tract, delivery can be accomplished only by cash payments. 6 " There-
fore, because it is likely that the commodity involved in oil-price
swaps is the intangible commodity price index, delivery can only be
accomplished by cash payments.
3. CFTC Interpretive Letters. 65-Although interpretive let-
ters are not binding on the CFTC, a series of consistent CFTC let-
ters may be deemed highly persuasive in concluding that oil-price
swaps should not be regulated by the CFTC. One such CFTC inter-
pretive letter'66 addressed a transaction in which a hog producer and
a hog processor contracted to sell hogs at a stated price in the future.
Simultaneously, but in a separate agreement, a brokerage firm
promised to pay the hog processor the variable price167 of the hogs.
In that separate agreement, the processor promised to pay the bro-
kerage firm the fixed price upon delivery of the hogs. The CFTC
determined that the separate agreement between the processor and
160. Stock index futures and municipal bond futures each involve an intangible index
commodity that is delivered by cash settlement. Telephone interview with Gaylen J. Byker,
Director, Chase Manhattan, Capital Markets Corp. (Sept. 23, 1987).
161. 1 P. JOHNSON, COMMODITIES REGULATION § 1.19, at 69 (1982). Telephone inter-
view with Gaylen J. Byker, Director, Chase Manhattan Bank, Capital Markets Corp. (Sept.
23, 1987). See also Schneider, supra note 136, at 862, (recognizing that delivery can be in the
form of cash settlement).
162. Telephone interview with Gaylen J. Byker, Director, Chase Manhattan Bank, Cap-
ital Markets Corp. (Sept. 17, 1987).
163. P. JOHNSON, supra note 161, at 69. For example, municipal bond index futures
contracts do not provide for the delivery of the municipal bonds. Rather, the cash value of the
contract as determined by the index is delivered. In addition, the Chicago Mercantile Ex-
change states that delivery of the underlying commodity in a Standard and Poor's 500 Stock
Price Index Futures Contract shall be by cash settlement. Chicago Mercantile Exchange Rule
4003. Telephone interview with Gaylen J. Byker, Director, Chase Manhattan Bank, Capital
Markets Corp. (Sept. 17, 1987).
164. Telephone interview with Gaylen J. Byker, Director, Chase Manhattan Bank, Cap-
ital Markets Corp. (Sept. 17, 1987).
165. CFTC Interpretive Letters are publications issued by the CFTC interpreting the
CEA and regulations thereunder.
166. CFTC Interpretive Letter No. 86-7 [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 23,455, at 33,210 (Jan. 30, 1987).
167. The variable price for the hogs was determined by the cash hog price on the date of
delivery. Thus, as in oil-price swaps, the variable price in the hog transaction was based on a
commodity price index. The only apparent difference is that this commodity price index cen-
tered around hogs rather than oil. Telephone interview with Gaylen J. Byker, Director, Chase
Manhattan Bank, Capital Markets Corp. (Oct. 17, 1987).
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the broker did not alter the nature of the transaction as a forward
contract."6 8 Oil-price swaps are technically the same type of ap-
proved transaction as described in this interpretive letter and thus
oil-price swaps should also be given approval. The only apparent dif-
ference is that an oil-price swap consists of two separate transactions
involving an intermediary, while the transaction described in the in-
terpretive letter consists of only one. The bank serving as an interme-
diary in an oil-price swap should not prevent the CFTC from con-
cluding that an oil-price swap is a forward contract. 6
Further support for allowing the off-exchange trading of oil-
price swaps is revealed by a second CFTC interpretive letter."" The
transaction discussed in this letter involved an export trading com-
pany that provided hedging services to commercial entities dealing in
international trade. Like oil-price swaps, the creditworthiness of the
participants formed the basis of the transaction, no physical com-
modity was delivered, and settlement was made in cash. The cash
settlement value was determined by the difference between the
agreed upon fixed price of the physical commodity and the value at
the end of the settlement period. In effect, oil-price swaps and the
above described transaction are identical. They both function as
hedging devices, are marketed only to sophisticated commercial enti-
ties, and culminate in a cash settlement based on the difference be-
tween a fixed and variable price. 7'
Based on the case law defining futures contracts and forward
contracts, as well as the CFTC interpretive letters, it appears that
oil-price swaps should not be subject to regulation by the CFTC. A
second exemption, however, referred to as the Treasury Amendment,
must also be analyzed.
4. Treasury Amendment Exemption.-The Treasury Amend-
ment 72 excludes, from the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction over fu-
tures contracts, transactions in foreign currency and other specified
168. CFTC Interpretive Letter No. 86-7 [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 23,455, at 33,210 (Jan. 30, 1987).
169. Id.
170. CFTC-OGC Interpretive Letter No. 86-5, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,227, at 36,616 (June 17, 1986).
171. Telephone interview with Gaylen J. Byker, Director, Chase Manhattan Bank, Cap-
ital Markets Corp. (Sept. 17, 1987).
172. CEA § 2(a)(1)(A), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982); 50 Fed. Reg. 42,963 (Oct.
23, 1985). See also supra note 103. See generally Johnson, Sackheim & Hale, Future Rate
Agreements: Implications under the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 COMMODITIES LAW LETTER
3(4) (1987). See generally Mitchel, The Treasury Amendment & Foreign Currency Forward
Transactions, 5 COMMODITIES LAW LETTER 1(5) (1985).
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financial instruments. 173 The CFTC has limited this exclusion by us-
ing a "sophisticated institution" test to determine the applicability of
the exemption. The CFTC has found that the Treasury Amendment
applies only to "transactions entered into by and between banks and
certain other sophisticated and informed institutional partici-
pants."174 If the instruments are marketed to the general public,
then they are automatically within the CFTC's jurisdiction.7 5 In
support of this restrictive interpretation, the CFTC relies on the leg-
islative history of the 1974 amendments to the CEA which reveals
that Congress, by adopting the Treasury Amendment, intended to
cure any unintended impact which adversely affected "the ability of
banks and other financial institutions to trade among themselves in
foreign currencies and certain financial instruments.'
'1 76
"Virtually all futures trading in foreign currencies in the United
States is carried out through an informal network of banks and deal-
ers."' 177 This network serves "the needs of international businesses in
hedging the risks that stem from foreign exchange rate movements.
The participants in this market are sophisticated and informed insti-
tutions, unlike the participants on organized exchanges . . ., who
may need to be protected by . . . governmental regulation.' 7 8
Although oil-price swaps are not one of the financial instru-
ments exempted by Congress, the reasoning behind the Amendment
and the CFTC's interpretation strongly supports the proposition that
oil-price swaps should not be subject to regulation by the CFTC.
Like the participants in the foreign currency market, oil-price swap
participants are sophisticated and informed institutions that seek to
hedge price risk in the long term. Because oil-price swaps involve the
same types of participants and meet needs similar to those of the
173. Section 2(a)(l)(A) of the CEA states that "[n]othing in this chapter shall be
deemed to govern . . . transactions in foreign currency, security warrants ... , resales of in-
stallment loan contracts, repurchase options, government securities, or mortgages and mort-
gage commitments, unless such transactions . . . [are] conducted on a board of trade." 7
U.S.C. § 2(a)(l)(A) (1982).
174. CFTC Interpretive Statement, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,963, at 42,964 (Oct. 23, 1985).
175. Id. Board of Trade v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137, 1154 (7th Cir.), vacated as moot, 459
U.S. 1026 (1982); CFTC & State of Georgia v. Sterling Capital Co., [1980-1982 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 21,169, at 24,783 (N.D. Ga. 1981); CFTC v. American
Bd. of Trade, 473 F. Supp. 1177, 1183 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). See P. JOHNSON, Commodities Reg-
ulation § 4.36, at 38-39 (1982); T. Russo, REGULATION OF THE COMMODITIES FUTURES AND
OPTION'S MARKET § 10.04, at 10-8 to 10-9 (1983).
176. S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 49-51 (1974); 50 Fed. Reg. 42,964, 42,965
(1985).
177. CFTC Interpretive Statement, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,963, at 42,965 (Oct. 23, 1985) (cit-
ing S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 49-50 (1974)).
178. Id.
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nonregulated instruments enumerated in the Treasury Amendment
exemption, oil-price swaps also should not be subject to regulation.
With the rapid pace of innovation of financial instruments it appears
absolutely impossible for Congress to enumerate a list of all the ex-
empted instruments. Any list compiled by Congress would be out-
dated by the time the amendments reached publication.
C. Additional Considerations
Although case law and CFTC interpretations are the fundamen-
tal basis of the analysis in this Comment, other aspects also should
be weighed in the ultimate decision of whether oil-price swaps con-
stitute futures or forward contracts. With the development of each
new instrument, the fine distinction that previously existed between a
futures contract and a forward contract becomes less pronounced.
Each instrument appears to possess characteristics of both forward
and futures contracts. In order to determine whether the hybrid in-
struments are of the type that Congress intended to fall within the
CEA, the legislative intent and purposes underlying the CEA be-
come most important. The CEA was enacted to ensure fair practice
and honest dealing on the commodity exchange, to protect interstate
commerce and to protect the general public.179 It appears, however,
that if oil-price swaps are classified as futures contracts such that
they fall under the CEA, few of these purposes of the Act will be
met. Currently, the general public has absolutely no involvement
with the swaps. If, however, the intermediaries begin allowing the
public to participate, the CEA surely would serve the necessary role
of protecting uninformed public participants.
Oil-price swaps are also commercially advantageous. Because
the swap terms are privately negotiated, the instruments can be indi-
vidually tailored to meet the specific needs of the parties to the con-
tract, needs that could not be met in the futures markets.""0 Off-
exchange trading also promotes the development of innovative prod-
ucts designed to meet the current economic conditions and the ever-
changing economy. Off-exchange trading may also attract market
participants who would not otherwise trade futures contracts.' 8 Oil-
179. 7 U.S.C. § 5 (1982). See supra notes 98, 109, 110 and accompanying text.
180. Exchange-traded futures contracts necessarily involve specific quantities of oil and
contract durations. The duration of futures contracts is typically short term. Conversely, oil-
price swaps typically extend from three to five years and possibly as long as fifteen years,
depending on the creditworthiness of the participants. Telephone interview with Gaylen J.
Byker, Director, Chase Manhattan Bank, Capital Markets Corp. (Sept. 23, 1987).
181. Id.
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price swaps do, in fact, attract additional participants because no
margin payments are required. 181 Companies or firms that are una-
ble to raise the margin money required in futures contracts may use
their creditworthiness to hedge against price variations.' Oil-price
swaps are also attractive because the participants are subject to less
risk as a result of the floor and ceiling limits. 84
In addition, if oil-price swaps are prohibited from being traded
off-exchange, then foreign enterprises that are not subject to regula-
tion by the CFTC will still be permitted to participate in the trans-
actions and will realize a competitive advantage over domestic
firms.'" Such a result occurs because swaps, with their customized
terms, cannot be traded on an exchange."' There would thus be no
way for the intermediary to market the swaps in the United States.
Although off-exchange trading may have advantages, under the
current CEA the law requires that these advantages cannot over-
come the mandate of section 4(a) of the CEA, which prohibits off-
exchange trading of futures contracts. 187 Another concern about al-
lowing these instruments to be traded off-exchange is their potential
for drawing market participants off the exchanges. This is an impor-
tant consideration, because exchanges cannot function properly un-
less there is a substantial volume of activity.' This is especially im-
portant as the number of new, innovative off-exchange instruments
continues to increase and threatens the livelihood of the
exchanges.' 9
Commodity exchanges consistently argue that if an instrument
"looks, acts, and feels" like a futures contract, it should be regulated
as a futures contract and traded on a designated exchange.' The
exchanges have several legitimate reasons for postulating this posi-
tion. First, if the look-alike futures contracts, serving the same func-
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. No-Action Letter, supra note 8, at 76,639.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. An analogous issue was addressed in In re Collins, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) V 22,982 (CFTC Apr. 4, 1986), in which the CFTC determined
that wash sales, transactions prohibited by the CEA, are illegal per se and cannot be permitted
merely because they are motivated by a "legitimate market purpose." This finding supports
the conclusion that financial instruments, if found to be futures contracts, cannot be permitted
to be traded off-exchange merely because there are benefits to off-exchange trading of the oil-
price swaps.
188. White & Stein, supra note 5, at 344. See infra note 192.
189. White & Stein, supra note 5, at 344.
190. Telephone interview with Bill Marshall, Press Relations, Chicago Bd. of Trade
(Sept. 23, 1987).
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tion as an exchange-traded futures contract, go unregulated, then an
"unlevel playing field"""1 develops and the exchanges will be subject
to competitive disadvantages. Without direct regulation, the off-ex-
change instruments would not be subject to the six to eighteen-
month delay typically associated with CFTC approval and designa-
tion of a contract market. In addition, oil-price swaps will not be
burdened with the increased expenses associated with complying
with federal regulations. Exchanges, which are obligated to abide by
the regulations, thus will be at a further disadvantage.
Most importantly, however, unregulated, off-exchange transac-
tions that serve the same function as futures contracts will draw par-
ticipants off the exchanges. This results in less liquidity on the ex-
changes. 192 Because exchanges cannot function without market
liquidity, the entire exchange system could collapse if too much vol-
ume is drawn away from the exchanges and into off-exchange instru-
ments. 193 An analysis of oil-price swaps must weigh the commercial
benefits to the participants and the economy against the costs of
drawing some participants off the exchanges. Because the swap par-
ticipants must meet the credit standards of the intermediary, the
swaps are not open to all those who are trading on the exchanges. In
considering the high credit standards required, it is likely that only a
small percentage of the exchange participants would qualify as swap
participants. In addition, Chase Manhattan Bank has attempted to
limit swap participants to hedgers. Thus, it appears that only a small
portion of futures exchange participants will be drawn off the ex-
changes. If, however, speculators do become actively involved, the
stability of the exchanges may be endangered and this high cost may
outweigh the commercial benefits to the individual participants.
Finally, in the absence of exchange trading, there will be little
consumer protection. Commodity exchanges pride themselves on
their record as fiduciary clearing houses that take both sides to the
transaction and secure it. In addition, the CEA imposes require-
ments on all exchanges to ensure the fairness and integrity of the
exchanges in order to protect interstate commerce and the public.1 9'
191. Id.
192. If participants are siphoned away from the exchanges, then the exchanges' ability
to provide liquidity is retarded. A smaller number of hedgers entering the market leads to less
liquidity which in turn dramatically affects the ability of the exchanges to attract business.
With less liquidity, prices would change more drastically with each trade. Telephone interview
with Paul Burick, Attorney, Chicago Mercantile Exchange (Sept. 26, 1987).
193. Id.
194. In general, designated contract markets or exchanges are required to police them-
selves and to take the necessary steps to insure against the dissemination of misleading infor-
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With oil-price swaps, however, these considerations are of little im-
portance because ordinary, unsophisticated consumers who are in
need of the protection afforded by the CEA are not involved in the
swaps.
There are several additional issues that must be considered to
complete this analysis. First, oil-price swaps are not the only swap
transactions available on the market. Off-exchange interest-rate
swaps195 emerged in the late 1970s and have developed into a mul-
tibillion dollar market that is not regulated by the CFTC.196 The
CFTC has refrained from instituting any enforcement or regulatory
actions of interest-rate swaps.1 97 The CFTC's relaxed view may be
because the major participants are institutions that are not in need
of the protection afforded by the CEA. 98 A comparison of oil-price
swaps with interest-rate swaps reveals that there is no difference be-
tween the two instruments with respect to the CEA. The underlying
commodity in both transactions is an intangible value: an interest
rate versus a price index. Therefore, there appears to be absolutely
no difference between the exchange of fixed and variable prices in
commodity-price index swaps and the exchange of fixed and variable
interest payments in interest-rate swaps. 199 Both transactions neces-
sarily involve cash settlement. Because of the similarity in these in-
struments, if interest-rate swaps are not subject to regulation, oil-
price swaps should also be free from regulation.
D. CFTC Proposed Regulatory Framework
On December 11, 1987, the CFTC issued an advance notice of
proposed rulemaking as prepared by the CFTC's Off-Exchange Task
Force. The notice, entitled "Regulation of Hybrid and Related In-
struments,"2 ' sets forth the Commission's position on regulation of
mation and price manipulation. 7 U.S.C. § 7. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v.
Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 361-62 (1981). More specifically, the CEA contains antifraud and anti-
manipulation provisions. 7 U.S.C. §§ 6b, 6c, 6o (1982). In addition, the exchanges have report-
ing and record keeping requirements as well as other technical requirements. 7 U.S.C. § 7
(1982). Further, the CEA gives the CFTC authority to seek injunctive relief, assess civil pen-
alties, issue cease and desist orders, revoke contract market designation, suspend contract mar-
ket registration, conduct investigations, and impose fines in order to protect the public and to
carry out the purposes of the CEA.
195. See supra note 5.
196. Interest-Rate Swap Market Rose to $313 Billion in 1986, Wall St. J., May 5,
1987, at 55.
197. Gilberg, supra note 5, at 1648.
198. Gilberg, supra note 5, at 1647.
199. Telephone interview with Gaylen J. Byker, Director, Chase Manhattan Bank, Cap-
ital Markets Corp. (Sept. 17, 1987).
200. Regulation of Hybrid and Related Instruments, 52 Fed. Reg. 47,022 (1987) (to be
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various hybrid instruments, including oil-price swaps and, in general,
commodity-price index swaps.
Specifically, the Commission takes the position that, in all likeli-
hood, the swaps are illegal.2"1 The CFTC, however, proposes a blan-
ket no-action position with respect to transactions solely involving
commercial participants, such that oil producers and consumers are
permitted to participate in the transactions."0 ' The CFTC's proposal,
however, prohibits intermediaries, such as Chase Manhattan Bank,
from participating in the swaps. 0 3 In proposing to prohibit swap
transactions involving intermediaries, the CFTC states that these
types of transactions "substantially depart from the context in which
the forward contract exclusion has historically operated." ''
In permitting swap transactions that do not involve in-
termediaries, the CFTC reasoned that, although the transactions
cannot be characterized as forward contracts, "such transactions
nonetheless appear to be essentially private, commercial transactions
that generally involve the exchange of interests in an actual physical
commodity." ' 5 In order for a transaction to come within the pro-
posed no-action arena the CFTC has proposed four requirements:
(1) "commercial counterparties;"20 6 (2) "commercial, nonspeculative
purpose;"2  (3) "nontransferability;120 8 and (4) "restriction to di-
rect, privately-negotiated transactions."209
In addition to setting forth the CFTC's position and proposed
regulatory framework, the notice seeks public comment on the pro-
posed rules.210 As anticipated, the CFTC received a large number of
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 34) (proposed Dec. 11, 1987).
201. The CFTC states that these swaps cannot be characterized as forward contracts so





205. Regulation of Hybrid and Related Instruments, 52 Fed. Reg. 47,022, at 47,027
(1987) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 34) (proposed Dec. 11, 1987).
206. Id. at 47,027. Each swap transaction may consist only of commercial counterpar-
ties which are actually capable of making or taking delivery of the underlying commodity. Id.
Thus, the parties must commercially use the underlying commodity in their ordinary course of
business. Id. In addition, each counterparty must make a reasonable investigation in order to
confirm that the counterparty is in fact a qualified commercial party. Id.
207. Id. The parties must participate in the transaction as part of their ordinary course
of business. Id. A party may not have a speculative or investment purpose. Id.
208. Id. at 47,028. Parties to the permitted swap transaction may not transfer their
contract risks or obligation to other entities. Id.
209. Id. The swap transaction may not involve "intermediation by a dealer, market-
maker or other third party." Id.
210. The initial comment period deadline was extended from February 9, 1988 to April
1, 1988.
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comments from various banking institutions, investment firms, oil
companies, federal regulatory agencies, and organized exchanges.2
As indicated by the large number of responses, the debate has not
ended. Banking institutions and other potential intermediaries pre-
dictably argue that the presence of intermediaries do not change the
nature of the swap transaction and therefore such intermediaries
should not be prohibited from participating in the transaction. Con-
versely, the exchanges continue to argue that all swaps are, in effect,
futures contracts and should therefore be subject to regulation by the
CFTC.21 Thus, although the CFTC has revealed its initial position,
the debate continues and will continue at least until the CFTC pub-
lishes the final regulatory scheme.
VI. Conclusion
Oil-price swaps should not be subject to regulation by either the
SEC or the CFTC. As this Comment explains, oil-price swaps lack
sufficient characteristics of securities and futures contracts. In addi-
tion, because the participants are sophisticated and informed institu-
tions that are striving to meet commercial needs, regulation of oil-
price swaps would not serve the purposes underlying either the CEA
or the Securities Act of 1933. Moreover, it is quite probable that the
CFTC will revise its proposed rulemaking and conclude that all
swaps, regardless of whether they involve intermediaries, will come
within the no-action area. If, however, the general public becomes
more involved in oil-price swaps, the swaps most likely will be sub-
ject to regulation.
With the rapid development of innovative financial instruments,
it is likely that the CFTC will be faced with many new issues similar
to those analyzed in this Comment. These new hybrid instruments
pose particular analytical problems for the CFTC because the ex-
isting definitions of futures and forward contracts have developed in
light of the traditional commodity futures contracts analysis. Ac-
cordingly, it is difficult to apply the traditional analysis to the new
hybrid financial instruments. While the distinctions between forward
and futures contracts are unclear, it is clear that the CFTC must
take affirmative action to revise the definitions of futures contracts
and forward contracts in order to be able to better deal with these
new emerging hybrid instruments.
211. The CFTC received 61 responses to the proposed rulemaking.
212. For information on the various comments, contact the Freedom of Information Of-
fice of the CFTC in Washington, D.C.
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The CFTC has several options by which it could more effec-
tively and efficiently deal with this new area of off-exchange instru-
ments. First, the CFTC could submit proposals to Congress that
would expand the Treasury Amendment exemption to include those
instruments, such as oil-price swaps, that have commercial advan-
tages and are used by informed and sophisticated institutions for
commercial purposes. Second, the CFTC could propose an amend-
ment to the CEA establishing a Private Offering Exemption similar
to the exemption in the Securities Act of 1933. Finally, whatever
route the CFTC chooses to take, the Commission must focus more
heavily on the economic realities of the instruments and the legisla-
tive intent underlying the CEA to determine whether the instru-
ments are of the type that Congress intended for the CEA to
regulate.
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